Abstract Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks are special case of ad hoc networks that, besides lacking infrastructure, communicating entities move with various accelerations. Accordingly, this impedes establishing reliable end-to-end communication paths and having efficient data transfer. Thus, VANETs have different network concerns and security challenges to get the availability of ubiquitous connectivity, secure communications, and reputation management systems which affect the trust in cooperation and negotiation between mobile networking entities. In this survey, we discuss the security features, challenges, and attacks of VANETs, and we classify the security attacks of VANETs due to the different network layers. 
Classification of attacks in
. Some problems in ad hoc networks which appear in VANETs communications like interference that can be produced from more than one node communicate to one node by a direct connection. So, the multi-hop connection is used with some technologies such as Bluetooth and frequency hopping [3] . But, due to the multi-hop transmission in VANETs, routing problems will exist greatly since no figure for a network infrastructure with vehicle entities. VANETs are considered a subclass of MANETs (Mobile Ad Hoc NETworks); but there some differences like topology change frequently with high speeds, high probability of network fragmentation since there are speedy vehicles, no strict limitations of power consumption, operation at large scales inside cities and their edges and high ways, and depending on vehicles behaviors in response or reaction for delivered messages [2] . Vehicles have specific units which make them communicate with other vehicles. These units are called On-Board Units (OBUs). In addition, the architecture of VANETs can take different styles which are cellular/WLAN (Wireless Local Area Network), ad hoc, and hybrid. For the first architecture, the vehicles receive and exchange data with base stations (also know by Road-Side Units (RSUs)) or fixed remote entities (V2R Communications). In the second one, the vehicles exchange messages directly together without intermediate entities (V2V communications). Finally, the hybrid architecture combines the last two architectures [1] . Furthermore, vehicles in VANETs transmit self-information to fixed remote nodes such as their speed, direction, acceleration and traffic conditions. Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) are a standard which is emerged to support IEEE 802.11 in communications between vehicles [4] . FCC has allocated a 75 MHz of DSRC spectrum at 5.9 GHz to be used in VANETs communications. Also, there is an IEEE P1609 working group which proposed DSRC as IEEE 802.11p standard which gives specifications for wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) layer and physical layer for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) as stated in [5] .
In this survey, we provide in the first section, an overview of VANETs, security requirements, their challenges and security attacks. Then, a classification of attacks in VANETs due to different network layers will be presented in the second section. Finally, conclusions and some recommended future issues will be discussed. Fig. 1 shows the structure of our survey.
Security Requirements of VANETs
Due to the nature of VANETs that they are self-organized networks, some security requirements should be found as follows [4, 6] 
VANETs challenges and security impact
The characteristics and features of VANETs make some challenges which can affect applying security approaches to establish secure communications in V2V and V2R. In the following section, we will mention some challenges for VANETs [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] : Figure 1 The hierarchy structure for our survey. In addition, secure mechanisms should be able to be applied with these applications without any effect on network efficiency and scalability. (6) Infrastructure-less: Some of possible architectures for VANETs depend on vehicles only in communicating. Therefore, no central servers or routers are used, and then a trust relationship should be established among vehicles using reputation management systems. (7) Wireless Link use: VANETs depend on wireless channels in communication whether in V2V or in V2R as ad hoc networks, and this requires strength security mechanisms to obtain confidential channels and have network integrity. (8) Multi-hop connection: VANETs sometimes depend in communications upon multivehicles to send information that each vehicle has to pass the received messages to possible neighbors in its range. Behaviors of vehicles have to be noticed that any mislead or misbehaved vehicle should be isolated and punished.
VANETs applications and requirements
There are two main types of applications in VANETs which are comfort (information/entertainment) applications, safety applications, and transport efficiency applications [2, 13] . Comfort applications are related with providing suitable convenience means for passengers like traffic information system, weather information, and locations of some centers of services such as gas stations and restaurants. Safety applications are related with enhancing the safety of passengers (vehicles) along the road; and this type of applications depends deeply on a trust negotiation between vehicles and remote base stations (IVC). Examples of safety applications such as receiving warning messages about emergency case (flood of water crosses a road at a specific space) at a certain distance in the road or an accident happened and vehicles traffic has to be changed to another direction. Transport efficiency applications aim to achieve an ideal use of road traffic, and also minimize vehicles collisions and traffic load. An example for the previous application is an advisory system delivered by vehicles through the road by trusted base stations to tell them about the optimal speed to arrive at the green phase of a traffic system. VANETs exhibits special characteristics where communicating vehicles move with various accelerations and the established successful communication channels among vehicles depend on trust interactions between vehicles. For the previous reasons, some requirements should be found to achieve success for VANETs applications such as increasing the ratio of vehicles equipped with VANET tools to other vehicles which have not. In addition some technical aspects are important such as required message size, frequency, latency constraints, communication ranges, and security levels [13] . Moreover, besides the last mentioned requirements, there is a dominant factor in achieving success in VANETs applications which is establishing secure Reputation Management Systems (RMS). This system can build strong relationship between vehicles, assign, and isolate the malicious and selfish vehicles from the network.
Attacks in VANETs
There are several attacks which can affect the performance of operation in VANETs. Some of these attacks are insider (happened from internal authorized vehicles which are malicious or compromised vehicles) and other ones are external attacks (occurred from outsider vehicles which do not belong to a specific VANET). Also, these attacks can be classified as passive attacks (that eavesdropper does not interact directly with authorized vehicles or affect intentionally the channel between them; but he can capture transferred information between those vehicles to analysis or to take an action) and active attacks (here eavesdropper tries to masquerade himself as a legitimate vehicle to redirect the path of transmitted data; and a breakdown in the transmission channel between authorized vehicles can be done) [9] . The following section will provide some attacks which can face VANETs such as [14] according to attacks' features. The following subsections provide the classification presented in [14] .
Attack nature
Some malicious attacks (false information is spread about unreal events or wrong identities of a group of vehicles in a VANET) cannot be detected due to their nature. A malicious vehicle in VANET can spoof itself like a legitimate vehicle that other communicating vehicles cannot observe although these vehicles have correct information (location and their interdistances) about themselves. As a consequence, some attacks such as Sybil attacks cannot be detected easily, and concerns should be established to build a strong trust negotiation depending on dynamic behavior of VANETs.
Attack target
The eavesdropper vehicles are strongly recommended to have attack target when they can communicate over long distances. These vehicles have more flexibility to send false announcements and information for other vehicles at long distances.
Hence, detecting such behaviors is hard than a local eavesdropper like man in the middle attacks. Accordingly, some configuration systems such as hierarchy systems should be used to describe some authenticated remote nodes which will authorize any new communicating vehicle outside its local VANET.
Attack scope
Attacks can be classified according to its affecting area such as limited and extended attacks. Limited attacks mean that the number or the area containing victim nodes (nodes handle uncorrected information due to malicious vehicles) is small. On the other side, extended attacks mean that the effect of malicious behavior has a great value on a large number of communicating vehicles or has happened in a large area of a VANET.
Attack impact
Attacks can also be classified due to their impacts on vehicles in VANETs. The first impact is that attacks are undetected; because communicating vehicles are isolated or there are many malicious vehicles around them. The second impact is that attacks may be detected; but they are not completely corrected because of insufficient information gathered by vehicles. Consequently, the communicating vehicles will receive incorrect data and may remain wrong for some time. Finally, attacks can be detected and corrected by vehicles since they are connected to a large number of honest remote nodes.
Hence, any received data can be checked and identified by those remote nodes to know whether it is corrected or uncorrected data. Then, we provide a classification of attacks in VANETs according to the stack of network layers. Depending on the layer that attackers use, we can classify that attack [6] . For example, by physical and data link layers, the eavesdropping vehicle can jam the communicating channel by transmitting unimportant messages which congest the traffic and achieve high load over that channel. In addition, these misbehaved vehicles can retransmit old messages or send false warning messages. Also, some intentional destroying works can be done such as tampering with OBUs or stealing RSUs. By network layer, eavesdropping vehicles can misroute the transmitted data by sending false routing messages. By application layer, some data about trusted vehicles can be captured and analyzed. Thus, tracking of these nodes will be done; and some important data can be revealed.
Classification of attacks in VANETs due to different network layers

Security threats in application layer
The application layer deals with vehicle data, so the attacker can handle some applications to capture and analyze specific information (e.g. location, acceleration, and vehicle packet loss characteristics [15] ) about vehicles found in a VANET. This information can help malicious vehicles in detecting future behaviors of other trusted vehicles. Also, the application layer contains important vehicle's information related to some protocols such as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and File Transfer Protocol (FTP). The malicious code attacks and repudiation attacks are the main attacks in the application layer. Moreover, applications performed with VANETs which require security cannot require long establishment delay due to the speed of vehicles. Also, the non-safety applications require efficient connection setup with remote vehicles when the communicating vehicles are in their coverage area [16] .
Malicious code attacks
The malicious vehicles can send some malicious codes such as virus, worm, spywares and Trojan horse to attack systems of vehicle or remote base stations. Also, these codes can destroy vehicles application, and then affect their services' access. This type of attack can help in gaining information about trusted vehicles in a VANET.
Repudiation attacks
A repudiation attack is an example of an application that adopts controls to properly track and log users' actions, thus permitting malicious manipulation or forging the identification of new actions. This attack is used in order to change authoring information of actions executed by a malicious node in order to log false data to log files. It can also be used to general data manipulation in the name of others, in a similar scheme as spoofing mail messages. If this attack takes place, the data stored on log files can be considered invalid or misleading.
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Firewall programs can provide protection against viruses, worms, spywares and Trojan horses. These programs can apply authentication and network filtering for incoming and outgoing packets. In addition, some programs such as anti-spyware can be used to detect spywares and malicious programs applied on any vehicle's system. Also, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) can be used to strengthen the operation of firewall programs that IDS can detect spoofed behaviors like acting a vehicle as a legitimate vehicle. Application layer has the capability of detecting DoS very quickly than other layers. Furthermore, two schemes were proposed in [17] to enhance the function of the application layer. The first one was application aware control scheme that all available applications should be registered and updated periodically. Messages containing information about these applications should be sent to all vehicles in VANETs. The second one was unified routing scheme that a packet of a certain application will be routed depending on this application's requirements and security demands.
Security threats in transport layer
The transport layer concerns with security topics such as authentication, securing end-to-end communications by data encryption, and handling delays, packet corruptions and loss. The transport layer used with VANET should support end-toend connection like TCP protocol in the internet model. Some attacks in the transport layer, which faces transport layer in VANETs, will be discussed.
SYN flooding attack
This Attack is considered as Denial of Service (DoS) attack that a large number of half-opened TCP connections are created between two communicating vehicles in a VANET. As depicted in Fig. 2 , the TCP connection depends on three handshake messages that a sender sends a SYN message which contains Initial Sequence Number (ISN) to a receiver. Then, that receiver acknowledges the received SYN message with an ACK message which contains its ISN. After that, the connection is established. The malicious vehicle sends flooding of SYN messages to a specific remote station or a vehicle. That vehicle spoofs return addresses of SYN messages that the received vehicles store many SYN messages and wait for ACK messages. The more received SYN messages by a vehicle (victim node), the more size required in its buffer to register these messages at its tables. Hence, a lot of resources' consumption has happened; its system may be out of service for a period of time.
Session hijacking
In this attack, the malicious vehicle can act as a legitimate vehicle in a VANET that it makes use of session establishment feature where no authentication at the beginning. It can spoof IP addresses of legitimate vehicles and insert correct sequence number to perform a DoS attack on other trusted vehicles. Consequently, legitimate vehicles whose IP addresses are used became unavailable for a period of time.
TCP ACK storm
As illustrated in Fig. 3 , this attack is done after establishing a TCP hijacking attack. The malicious vehicle sends session data with certain sequence number to a vehicle; then that vehicle acknowledges these data to another vehicle. Afterward, the last received vehicle is confused with the received sequence number. Then it acknowledges and resynchronizes the TCP connection with the malicious vehicle by sending the required sequence number packet. The last step is repeated many times and this represents the TCP ACK storm [19] .
Countermeasures on transport layer attacks
Data encryption is a main concern to achieve end-to-end communication confidentiality in the transport layer. TCP does not fit MANET; as a consequence, it will not fit VANET. Also, TCP feedback (TCP-F), TCP Explicit Failure Notification (TCP-ELFN), Ad-hoc Transmission Control Protocol (ATCP), and Ad-hoc Transport Protocol (ATP) [20] are deployed for MANET and do not overcome security issues in MANET which also will not be suitable for VANET. Some protocols were established to provide a secure channel based on public key cryptography like Secure Socket Layer (SSL), Transport Layer Security (TLS), and Private Communications Transport (PCT), which are presented in [21] . For instance, TLS/SSL makes immunity against masquerade, man-in-middle, rollback, and replay attacks.
Security threats in network layer
In VANET, the topology is dynamic due to the movements of vehicles (communicating nodes). So, the issue of maintaining a route for any vehicle has a big challenge in VANETs. Also, the communicating vehicles or remote base stations can work as routers in order to expand and facilitate the communication capabilities to other vehicles in the network. The main concern of the communicating vehicles is to establish an optimal and efficient route that broadcasting information can be spread easily and quickly to other vehicles. Any attack in routing phase may interrupt the overall communication and the entire network can be paralyzed. Therefore, security in network layer plays a vital role in the security of the whole network. 
Routing protocols
Many routing protocols have been developed for MANETs. VANETs and MANETs share similar characteristics such as self-organized, self-management networks, low bandwidth and short communication range. Hence, most routing protocols applied for MANETs can be applied for VANETs [22] . The main target of the routing protocols is to provide secure communication and remove defects in the existing protocols. Some of these protocols such as SRP (on-demand source routing), Ariadne (on-demand source routing), endairA (ondemand source routing), S-AODV (on-demand distance vector routing), ARAN (on-demand, routing metric is the propagation delay), SEAD (proactive distance vector routing), SMT (multi-path routing combined error correcting) can be classified into the following categories.
Types of Ad-Hoc routing protocols
Basically there are two types of routing protocols:
Proactive Routing Protocols: Herein the nodes keep updating their routing tables by periodical messages. This can be seen in Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) and the Topology Broadcast based on Reverse Path Forwarding Protocol (TBRPF). Also the Table Driven routing protocol where one or more tables are used to store routing information changes in network topology etc., in order to maintain a consistent network environment. Some common examples are DSDV (Highly Dynamic Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector routing protocol), DBF (Distributed Bellman-Ford Routing Protocol), HSR (Hierarchical State Routing) protocol, (SPAAR) Secure Position Aided Ad hoc Routing protocol as a method to protect position information in a high-risk environment [23] .
Reactive or On Demand Routing Protocols: Here the routes are created only when they are needed. The application of this protocol can be seen as follows: on-demand protocols are Admission Control enabled On demand Routing (ACOR), Ant-based Routing Algorithm for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks, Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), DYnamic Manet On-demand Routing (DYMOR), Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol (AODV), On-Demand Anonymous Routing (ODAR) in Ad Hoc Networks for wireless ad hoc networks to enable complete anonymity of nodes, links and source-routing paths/trees using Bloom filters [24] .
Ad Hoc On-Demand Position-Based Private (AO2P) Routing Protocol proposed for communication anonymity. Only the position of the destination is exposed in the network for route discovery. To discover routes with the limited routing information, a receiver contention scheme is designed for determining the next hop [25] .
Other routing protocols
There are two other types of routing protocol namely Hybrid and Hierarchical. The hybrid routing protocol is a combination of proactive and reactive scheme. On the other hand, the hierarchical protocols include scalable routing strategies and create a hierarchy which is followed in the way of anttrail. Hazy Sighted Link State routing protocol (HSLS) and Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) are hybrid protocols whereas Distributed Dynamic Routing Algorithm (DDR), Hierarchical State Routing (HSR), OORP Order One Routing Protocol (HSR) are examples of hierarchical protocol. Another protocol is also used in MANET which is identified as geographical routing protocol. Geographic routing refers to a family of mechanisms to route data packets in a communication network. Adaptive Location Aided Routing -Mines (ALARM) and Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) are geographic protocols. Border node Based Routing (BBR) protocol concerns with enhancing VANETs with low node density and high node mobility to deliver messages with minimized delivered delay and high reliability [26] .
Recently, a novel Cross Layer Weighted Position based Routing (CLWPR) [27] was proposed following the minimal weight hop based routing periodically broadcasted by each node. This protocol calculates the distance to be traveled to reach the destination. To make this possible, e-maps are to be imported on the vehicles. The selection of the path to be traveled to reach the destination is chosen close to the junction so that nodes traveling in the direction of the destination can be identified. This protocol provides better PDR and end to end delay when compared with GPSR. Prediction based approach helps in achieving better PDR and reducing network overhead. SNIR information and Carry and Forward mechanism help reducing end to end delay.
Mobility aware Ant Colony or MARDYMO is another transformative approach that utilizes AI to optimize the routing aspects [28] . MARDYMO uses Ant colony optimization in the existing dynamic MANET On-demand (DYMO) reactive protocol. MARDYMO predicts the mobility, position, speed, and displacement. MARDYMO adds a time stamp to the Hello message and is sent in an aperiodic manner using which the nodes will have updated information on their neighbors. To implement Ant colony optimization the routing tables will have the pheromone level associated with it, the evaporation rate and the predicted lifetime. MARDYMO has shown good packet delivery ratio and lesser routing overhead when compared with AODV. On the other hand PDR and end to end delay of MARDYMO are greater than other similar techniques with a better routing overhead.
Geographic Stateless VANET Routing protocol (GeoSVR) [29, 30] proposed by Xiang et al. routes data using node location and digital map. This protocol consists of two main algorithms namely, optimal forwarding path algorithm and restricted forwarding algorithm. The main issue in forwarding data is the local maximum and sparse connectivity problem.
Optimal forwarding path algorithm eliminates the problem of sparse connectivity by considering the vehicle density.
The optimal forwarding path cannot be calculated using traffic information so the map is considered as the weighted graph. Dijkstra algorithm is applied to this graph to fine the optimal forwarding path with minimum weight. But there may be more than one route with minimum weight. In order to find the optimal forwarding path, GeoSVR calculates the derivation of the each path and chooses the one with lowest value. The restricted forwarding algorithm is used to identify the next hop node to forward the data.
Routing protocols are classified into [1, [10] [11] [12] five categories which are ad hoc, position-based, cluster based, broadcast, and geocast routing protocols. The first category is ad hoc routing protocols which contain routing protocols which can be performed in ad hoc networks (MANETs or VANETs) such as AODV and DSR. Due to the highly dynamic nature of vehicle mobility in VANETs, two prediction-based AODV protocols, PRAODV and PRAODV-M, were established to overcome the problems of high probability routes' breakage in AODV. PRAODV can maintain an alternative route before expiry of the estimated lifetime of a route established by AODV. PRAODV-M selects the maximum predicted lifetime route instead of using the shortest path as done in AODV and PRAODV. The second category is position-based routing protocols. The routing protocols in this category concern with the vehicle position which is a major issue in VANETs. Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) is one example for this category. Some routing protocols were issued under this category to overcome GPSR problems (greedy communications may be not available, long delays and message loops) such as Geographic Source Routing (GSR), Greedy Perimeter Coordinator Routing (GPCR) and Anchor-based Street and Traffic Aware Routing (A-STAR). There is a proposed routing protocol like Greedy Other Adaptive Face Routing (GOAFR). Also, a Greedy Face Routing with Identification Support (GFRIS) was proposed in [31] .
The third category is the cluster based which is based on creating virtual network infrastructure, which forms clusters with a cluster head for everyone. Then, there are intra and intercluster communications. An example for this category is Location based Routing Algorithm_Cluster Based Flooding (LORA_CBF) [38] .
The fourth category is broadcast that the routing protocols used in it can be used for distributing information such as traffic jam areas and weather information. Examples of these protocols are the emergency broadcast protocol, BROADCOMM, which is based on a hierarchical structure for a highway network. Also, Vector-based TRAcking DEtection (V-TRADE) and History-enhanced V-TRADE (HV-TRADE) are GPS based message broadcasting protocols.
The fifth category is the geocast routing protocols which are basically a location-based multicast routing. The main target of these protocols is to deliver messages from a specific vehicle or a base station to certain number of vehicles in a certain geographical area. The geocast multicast approaches depend on directing flooding, and limiting message overhead and network congestion. An example of this category is a Inter-Vehicles Geocast (IVG) protocol. This protocol is proposed to broadcast an alarm message to all the vehicles being in risk area based on defer time algorithm in a high way.
Types of attacks faced by routing protocols
The attacks common on ad-hoc routing protocols can be generally classified into passive and active attacks.
A Passive Attack does not disrupt the process of the protocol, but tries to discover precious information by eavesdropping the traffic. Passive attacks involve obtaining essential routing information by sniffing network. Such attacks are usually difficult to detect; therefore, defending against such attacks is complicated. Even if it is not possible to identify the accurate location of a node, one may be able to determine information about the network topology, using these attacks.
An Active Attack injects arbitrary packets and tries to interrupt the operation of the protocol in order to limit accessibility, gain authentication, or grape packets destined to other nodes. The goal is basically to attract all packets to the attacker for analysis or to disable the network. Such attacks can be detected and the nodes can be identified.
The following list includes some of the attacks that face the routing layer and some of the routing protocols.
Routing table overflow attack
This attack faces proactive routing algorithms, which update routing information periodically. To launch this attack, the attacker tries to create routes to nonexistent nodes to the approved nodes present in the network. The attacker can simply send extreme route announcements to overflow the target system's routing table. The goal is to have enough routes so that creation of new routes is prohibited or the implementation of routing protocol is overwhelmed.
Routing cache poisoning attack
Routing cache poisoning attack uses the advantage of the promiscuous mode of routing table updating. This occurs when information stored in routing tables is either deleted, altered or injected with false information. Assume a malicious node M wants to poison routes node to X. M could broadcast spoofed packets with source route to X via M itself, thus neighboring nodes that overhear the packet may add the route to their route caches [19] .
Attacks on particular routing protocols
Since the main purpose of this survey is to classify the attacks by layer we have to list the attacks in VANET that aim the exacting routing protocols. The main problem of these protocols is that it does not pay too much attention to the security issues. Most of the recent research suffers from this problem. The next will list the security threats, advantage and disadvantage of some common routing protocols.
AODV
The Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing algorithm is a reactive algorithm that routes data across wireless mesh networks. The benefit of AODV is that it is straightforward, requires less memory and does not create additional traffic for communication along existing links. In AODV, the attacker may advertise a route with a smaller distance metric than the original distance or advertise a routing update with a large sequence number and invalidate all routing updates from other nodes. Another version of AODV was proposed (Secure AODV) to provide more secure authentication (using signatures) and integrity (using hash chains) in AODV through multihop connection.
DSR
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol is like AODV in that it also forms route on-demand. The difference between them is the use of source routing instead of relying on the routing table at each intermediate node. It also allows the option of a packet can forward on a hop-by-hop basis. In DSR, it is possible to modify the source route listed in the RREQ or RREP packets by the attacker. Deleting a node from the list, switching the order or appending a new node into the list is also the potential dangers in DSR.
ARAN
Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks (ARAN) is an on-demand routing protocol that detects and protects against malicious actions [32] . This protocol introduces authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation as a part of a minimal security policy. Though ARAN is designed to enhance ad-hoc security, still it is immune to rushing attack described later.
ARIADNE
ARIADNE is an on-demand secure ad-hoc routing protocol based on DSR that outfits highly efficient symmetric cryptography. It provides point-to-point authentication of a routing message using a message authentication code (MAC) and a shared key between the two communicating parties. Although ARIADNE is free from a flood of RREQ packets and cache poisoning attack, it is immune to the wormhole attack and rushing attack.
SEAD
Specifically, SEAD builds on the DSDV-SQ version of the Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) protocol. It deals with attackers that change routing information and also with replay attacks and makes use of one-way hash chains rather than execute expensive asymmetric cryptography operations. The system uses two different approaches which are used for message authentication to prevent the attackers. Also SEAD does not cope with wormhole attacks.
Other advanced attacks
In recent researches, more sophisticated and subtle attacks have been identified in VANET. Some protocols also enhanced their services and some other routing protocols are proposed to overcome the attacks. Still it is an area of interest for the security personal. However, the black hole (or sinkhole), Byzantine, wormhole, and rushing attacks are the typical examples which are described below in detail.
Rushing attacks
This is a new attack that results in denial-of-service when used against all previous on-demand ad hoc network routing protocols. Specifically DSR, AODV, and secure protocols based on them, such as Ariadne, and ARAN are unable to discover routes longer than two hops when subject to this attack.
An attacker that can forward route requests more quickly than legitimate can increase the probability that routes that include the attacker will be discovered rather than other valid routes. One of the main danger features of this attack is it can be performed by a relatively weak attacker. A proposed defense mechanism against this attack is named Rushing Attack Prevention (RAP) [33] .
Wormhole attack
Wormhole attack or tunneling attack is where two or more nodes may collaborate to encapsulate and exchange messages between them along existing data routes. This exploit gives the opportunity to a node or nodes to short-circuit the normal flow of messages creating a virtual vertex cut in the network that is controlled by the two colluding attackers. In Fig. 4,   M1 and M2 are the two malicious nodes that encapsulate data packets and falsified the route lengths.
Black hole attack
The black hole attack is performed in two steps, as depicted in Fig. 5 . At first step, the malicious node exploits the mobile ad hoc routing protocol such as AODV, to advertise itself as having a valid route to a destination node, even though the route is spurious, with the intention of intercepting the packets. In second step, the attacker consumes the packets and never forwards. In an advanced form, the attacker suppresses or modifies packets originating from some nodes, while leaving the data from the other nodes unaffected. In this way, the attacker falsified the neighboring nodes that monitor the ongoing packets, [34] .
Byzantine attack
Byzantine attack can be launched by a single malicious node or a group of nodes that work in cooperation. A compromised intermediate node works alone or set of compromised intermediate nodes works in collusion to form attacks. The compromised nodes may create routing loops, forwarding packets in a long route instead of optimal one, even may drop packets. This attack degrades the routing performance and also disrupts the routing services.
Resource consumption attack
Energy is a critical parameter in the MANET. Batterypowered devices try to conserve energy by transmitting only when absolutely necessary [34] . The target of resource consumption attack is to send request of excessive route discovery or unnecessary packets to the victim node in order to consume the battery life. An attacker or compromised node thus can disrupt the normal functionalities of the MANET. This attack has no tremendous effect in VANETs, since there is no strong restriction on energy resources. Figure 4 Path length spoofed by tunneling, Reference [18] . Figure 5 The black-hole problem, Reference [18] .
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Location disclosure attack
Location disclosure attack is a part of the information disclosure attack. The malicious node leaks information regarding the location or the structure of the network and uses the information for further attack. It gathers the node location information such as a route map and knows which nodes are situated on the target route. Traffic analysis is one of the unsolved security attacks against VANETs.
Security threats in link layer
The VANET is an open multipoint peer-to-peer network design in which the link layer protocols preserve one-hop connectivity among the neighbors. Many attacks in the link layer disrupt the cooperation of the protocols of this layer. Wireless medium access control (MAC) protocols have to organize the transmission of the nodes on the regular communication or transmission medium. The IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol uses distributed contention resolution mechanisms which are based on two different coordination functions. One is Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) which is completely distributed access protocol and the other is a centralized access protocol named Point Coordination Function (PCF). For resolving channel contention among the several wireless hosts, DCF uses a carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance or CSMA/CA technique.
Threats in IEEE 802.11 MAC
The IEEE 802.11 MAC is exposed to DoS attacks. To initiate the DoS attack, the attacker may use the binary exponential backoff scheme. For example, the attacker may damage frames easily by adding some bits or disregard the ongoing transmission. Among the competing nodes, the binary exponential method favors the last winner which directs to capture effect. Capture effect means that nodes which are seriously loaded tend to capture the channel by sending data constantly, thereby resulting lightly loaded neighbors to backoff for a long time. Malicious nodes may take the advantage of this capture effect weakness. Moreover, it can cause a chain reaction in the upper level protocols using backoff scheme, like TCP window management [19] .
Another weakness to DoS attacks is exposed in IEEE 802.11 MAC through Network Allocation Vector (NAV) field carried in the Ready to Send/Clear to Send (RTS/CTS) frames. During the RTS/CTS handshake, a small RTS frame containing the time needed to complete the CTS, data and ACK frames is sent by the sender. All the neighbors of the sender and receiver update their NAV field according to the time that they overheard for transmission duration. The attacker in the local neighborhood also knows the duration of the current transmission and he may transmit a few bits within this period to cause bit errors in a victim's link layer frame using wireless interference [35] .
Threats in IEEE 802.11 WEP
IEEE 802.11 standards provided the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). It was designed to grant security for WLAN. But it bears many design problems and some weakness in the way RC4 cipher used in WEP. It is known that WEP is exposed to message privacy and message integrity attacks and probabilistic cipher key recovery attacks. Now, WEP is replaced by AES in 802.11i. Some of the limitation of the WEP is described below.
1. Key management is not specified in the WEP protocol.
With no key management system the protocol is exposed to attacks exploiting manually distributed secrets shared by large populations. 2. The initialization vector (IV) used in WEP is a 24-bit field which is sent in clear and also the attacker knows that it uses the RC4 which leads to probabilistic cipher key recovery attack or analytical attack. 3. The joint use of a non-cryptographic integrity algorithm, CRC 32 with the stream chipper is a security hazard and may cause message privacy and message integrity attacks.
Countermeasures on link layer attacks
The security concerns that are closely related to link layer are protecting the wireless MAC protocol and providing link-layer security support. One of the weaknesses in link layer is its binary exponential backoff scheme. But lately a security extension to 802.11 was proposed in [16] . The original 802.11 backoff scheme is somewhat modified. The backoff timer at the sender is provided by the receiver as a substitute of setting random timer value on its own. The threats of resource consumption (using NAV field) are still an open challenge though some techniques have been proposed such as ERA-802.11 [36] . In regard to the security fault in link layer weakness of WEP, the 802.11i/WPA has fixed all obvious ambiguity in WEP and future countermeasures such as Robust Secure Network/ Advanced Encryption Standard Cipher block Chain Message authentication code Protocol (RSN/AESCCMP) are also being developed to improve the strength of wireless security.
Security threats in physical layer
Physical layer security is vital for securing VANET as many attacks can occur in this layer. The physical layer must adapt to quick changes in link characteristics. The most familiar physical layer attacks in VANET are eavesdropping, interference, denial-of-service and jamming. The common radio signal in VANET is easy to jam or intercept. Furthermore an attacker can eavesdrop or disrupt the service of wireless network physically. Here we will describe these attacks in brief. Some motivations were done to make reliable connection between the vehicles. In [37] , the authors adapted a reliable MAC protocol in directional and omni-directional transmissions in VANETs. They developed Batch Mode Multicast MAC (BMMM) protocol that uses control frames for broadcast transmissions to overcome problem of collisions at sending multiple data in the same time.
Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping is the reading of messages and conversations by not deliberate receivers. The nodes in VANETs allocate a wireless medium and the wireless communication using RF spectrum and broadcast, which can be simply intercepted with receivers adjusted to the proper frequency. So transmitted message can be eavesdropped as well as false message can be injected into the network.
Interference and jamming
Jamming and interfering of radio signals causes message to be dropped or corrupted. A good transmitter can generate signal that will be strong enough to overcome the target signal and can interrupt communications. Pulse and random noise are the most frequent type of signal jamming [19] .
Countermeasures on physical layer attacks
The physical layer of VANET is protected to signal jamming, DoS attack and also some passive attacks. Two spread spectrum techniques can be used to make it hard to detect or jam signals. Spread spectrum technique changes frequency in a random style or spreads it to a wider spectrum which makes the capture of signal hard. The Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) makes the signal incoherent period impulse noise to the eavesdroppers. On the other hand, Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) symbolizes each data bit in the original signal by multiple bits in the transmitted signal through 11-bit Barker code. But, both FHSS and DSSS cause difficulties for the malicious user while trying to interrupt the radio signals. To capture and release the content of transmitted signal, the attacker must make out frequency band, spreading code and modulation techniques. Still, there is a difficulty. These mechanisms are secure only when the hopping pattern or spreading code is unidentified to the eavesdropper [19] . Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can be used to detect jammed signal.
Related open research areas
Many researches in VANETs are ongoing for many years but still need more to be done. The existing researches aimed to face specific attacks, and they can solve many of them but still vulnerable to others. Also in the field of security resource consumption for different DOS attacks needs to be investigated. More research is required on secure routing protocol, robust key management, trust based systems, integrated approaches to routing security, data security in different level and cooperation enforcement. Current routing protocols are vulnerable to a variety of attacks that can permit attackers to control a victim's selection of routes or enable denial-of service attack. Jamming is one of DoS attacks and it can be vanquished using multiple transceivers which can operate in different frequency bands. Cryptography is used commonly for security and its strength relies on the secure key management. The public cryptography scheme depends upon centralized Certificate Authority (CA), which is known as a security weak point in VANET because it creates a single point of failure. Symmetric cryptography is efficient but suffers from potential attack on key distribution. That is why, efficient key agreement and distribution in VANET are an ongoing research area. Finally, Building trust-based system and integrating it to the current defensive approaches, solution of the node selfishness problem can be considered in future research. Identifying new security threats as well as new countermeasures demands more research in VANET.
Some routing protocols depend on assigning locations of vehicular nodes such as GSR or GOAFR (position based routing protocols). The determination of such locations requires using specific equipment like Global Positioning System (GPS) tools. In addition, a trusted node or center (location service center), which can provide communicating vehicles about their locations, can be used. Hence, a trusted negotiation system should be established in VANETs to verify trusted communing vehicular nodes and location service centers. Furthermore, secure positioning scheme should be considered that each vehicular node has to know its position and their neighbors' positions in a way which lacks of spoofing and jamming. Also, some trusted centers can be used to receive weak GPS signals that they strengthen these signals and retransmit them.
Data verification about certain happened event is a major issue that each vehicular node can use correlation mechanisms of received data messages related to that event. Such mechanisms should be tested in highly dynamic VANETs where there is large change in number of vehicles and their speeds.
Mathematical models can be established to simulate VANETs in various situations which consider different parameters such as data traffic loads, used communication channels and probabilities of reception and latency.
Conclusion
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are infrastructure-less networks comprising mobile communicating entities with intermittent connectivity. VANETs characteristics lead to security vulnerabilities related to the various networking layers in the traditional Internet protocol stack architectures. In this survey, we have overviewed VANETs clarifying their security requirements and challenges. Also, we have provided attack classification which categorized security threats to VANETs with respect to each operating layer in the five protocol layered stack model. Additionally, we have discussed countermeasures on attacks facing each layer.
